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would seem to offer very little consolation, since makers of worth-




THE TREATMENT OF WARRANTY PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE
SALE OF GOODS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. - Among
the many areas of the law in which the Uniform Commercial Code
will work substantial changes must be listed those sections of it
which deal with the problems arising from warranties. It has long
been recognized that the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act
regulating these questions are in need of adjustment and overhaul.,
In general, the Uniform Commercial Code undertakes this difficult
task with effectiveness and insight, and a comparison of its pro-
visions with the present law of North Dakota will indicate at once
how much improvement has been made.
I.
The first major provision of the Uniform Commercial Code
dealing with warranties is §2-313, which undertakes to prescribe
the situations in which express warranties of quality or otherwise
will be read into a contract of sale. Section 2-313 introduces two
significant changes in existing law. Under this section, for instance;
"any description of the goods which is made a basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that goods shall conform..." This
broadens the Uniform Sales Act, which provides that an express
warranty is created only if the "natural tendency ... is to induce
the buyer to purchase."2 Another change would be effected in re-
gard to a sale by sample and description; the UCC provides that
such a sale creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform thereto, while the North Dakota Code provides
that an implied warranty is thereby created.' The purpose of the
latter change could well be to make the warranty effective despite
a possible disclaimer clause elsewhere in the contract.
Two significant modifications of existing law would also be
1. See Note, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 173 (1950).
2. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0113 (1943). See also Nielson v. Hermanson, 109 Utah 180,
166 P.2d 536 (1946); Teter v. Schultz, 110 Ind. App. 541, 39 N.E.2d 802 (1942);
Letnz v. Omar Baking Co., 125 Neb. 861, 252 N.W. 410 (1934); Glaspey v. Wool
Grower's Service Corp., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929).'
3. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0115 (7) (1943).
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occasioned by the adoption of §2-314 of the Commercial Code.
These are the creation of a minimum standard of merchantability
and the final determination that food served for value represents a
sale4 rather than an "uttering of service." As represented by case
law, the courts have been far from uniform in their decisions on
both these problems.5 A special rule that a sale by a merchant
implies a warranty of merchantability will serve to make applicable
the minimum standard as provided for. The section also provides
that a merchant not usually handling goods of the type sold would
not be held to give a warranty of merchantability except where he
specifically states that the goods are guaranteed.
Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
"A seller's warranty ... extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or *who is a guest in his
home... and who is injured . . . by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
The elimination by this section of the requirement of privity
of contract in the maintenance of an action for personal injuries
caused by the sale of defective goods is one of the more important
changes which the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
would make in existing law.' The great majority of courts, includ-
ing North Dakota, adhere to the common law rule that in order to
recover for breach of warranty privity of contract must be shown
between the warrantor and the person seeking recovery.7  How-
ever, criticism of the rule has been widespread and there has been
a rcent tendency to allow recovery in cases involving injuries
caused by food," and beverages, 9 although privity in the strict sense
was lacking. Even more indicative of the harshness of the privity
requirement is the fact that many courts have resorted to the use
4. That it is not a sale: Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 Ati.
105 (1938); McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934). Contra:
Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal.App.2d 537, 88 P.2d 220 (1939); Ford v. Waldorf System, 57 R.I.
131, 188 Atl. 633 (1937); Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936);
Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal.2d 683, 59 P.2d 142 (1936).
5. In addition to the cases cited in note 
4
,supra, see Agoos Kid. Co. v. Blumenthal
Import Corp., 281 Mass. 1, 184 N.E. 279 (1933); Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Quahbin
Improvement Co., 234 App. Div. 96, 254 N.Y. Supp. 123 (1931); Empire Cream Separator
Co. v. Quinn, 184 App. Div. 302, 171 N.Y. Supp. 413 (1918).
6. Note that § 2-318, supra, purports to make no change in cases where property
damage, as distinguished from personal injury, is involved.
7. Duncan v. Juman,.25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953); Wood v. General
Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953); Timpson v. Marshall, Meadows &
Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1950); Wood v. Advance Rumely
Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
8. Martin v. Great Atlntic & Pacific Tea Co., 301 Ky. 429, 192 S.W.2d 201 (1946);
Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Il. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1945); Haute v.
Kleene, 320 Il. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 855 (1943); Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614,
31 A.2d 316 (1943).
9. Patargias v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 332 I1. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947);
Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 111. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943).
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of legal fictions to supply privity. Thus, it has been held in such
cases that:
1. The manufacturer represents to the public at large that his
goods are fit for consumption and the consumer may rely thereon."0
2. The plaintiff, although not a purchaser, may sue as the
assignee of the purchaser's right.-i
3. The consumer is a third party beneficiary.'"
4. The warranty runs with the goods.13
Other courts have bluntly stated that privity is simply not a
condition precedent to recovery. 14 And there has been a sharp
expansion of the concept of tort liability,"5 particularly in the case
of food served and eaten on the premises of the seller.'
To summarize: while the right of the seller to modify or dis-
claim the effect of an implied warranty is retained in the proposed
code, 17 he is powerless to limit the class of persons who will benefit
thereunder." In short, if a warranty is made by the seller, the
seller's liability will extend to those designated by the Uniform
Commercial Code, contractual provisions to the contrary notwith-
standing.
The Uniform Commercial Code further confers wide discre-
tionary powers upon the courts in some types of contract cases.
They may, if they see fit, refuse to enforce "unconscionable" con-
tracts or strike out "unconscionable" clauses therein.1" Any ex-
10. Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912).
11. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
12. Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal.2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938); Ward Baking
Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
13. Patargias v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947);
Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1907).
14. Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945); Griggs Canning
Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,
14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
15. Duncan v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super, 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953); Dumbrow v. Ettinger,
44 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Smith v. Salem Coca Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25
A.2d 125 (1942); Borucki v. McKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1939); Hazel-
ton v. First National Stores, 88 N.H. 409, 190 Atl. 280 (1937).
16. Albrecht v. Rubinstein, 135 Conn. 243, 63 A.2d 158 (1948); Child's Dining Hall
Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 At. 105 (1938).
17. Section 2-318, Comment 1: "The last sentence of this section does not mean that a
seller is precluded from excluding or disclaiming a warranty which might otherwise arise
in connection with the sale provided such exclusion or modification is permitted by section
2-316." See Jesperson v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 494, 240 N.W. 876 (1932);
Holden v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 584, 239 N.W. 479 (1931); Palanink v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 57 N.D. 199, 220 N.W. 638 (1928); Minneapolis Threshing-
Machine Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926).
18. Section 2-318, Comment 1: "What this last sentence forbids is exclusion of liability
by the seller to the persons to whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer would
extend under this section."
19. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1): "'If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to be unconscionable it may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable:
clauses and enforce the contract as if the striken clause had never existed."
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clusive or limited remedy which the parties have seen fit to adopt
may, if in the court's considered opinion it "might fail of its
essential purpose," be disregarded.20 Needless to say, "unconsc-
ionable" limitations or exclusions of consequential damages could
be refused enforcement.
2'1
These latter provisions have drawn some criticism. It has been
suggested 2 that the proposed grant of power to the courts to police
contracts is undesirable on two grounds at least: "(1) Demon-
stration by experience that judicial process is incapable of handling
difficulties inherent in policing contracts; and (2) the absence of a
fixed standard for the exercise of such power."23 The comments in
the Uniform Commercial Code itself, however, 'seem to provide the
best answer: "In the past such policing has been accomplished by
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of
offer and acceptance or by determination that the clause is con-
trary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract
... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because
of superior bargaining power.
24
II.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for an implied war-
ranty that the goods will be fit for the particular purpose intended
where the seller had reason to know of the purpose and the buyer
relies on his skill or judgement.25 It should be noted that the pro-
vision requires only that the seller have "reason to know" the
particular purpose for which the goods are required in order that
a warranty of fitness for that particular purpose may be implied. 2
The corresponding provision in the Uniform Sales Act requires
that the buyer "expressly or by implication make known to the
seller" the particular purpose for which the goods are sought.27
Under the present law, therefore, in order for a warranty of fitness
20. U.C.C. § 2-719 (2): "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided by law."
21. U.C.C. § 2-719 (3): "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation is unconscionable. Limitation of conequential damages for injury to person is
prima facie unconscionable, but limitation of damage where loss is commercial is not."
22. 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 146 (1950).
23. 28 N.Y.S. Bar Bulletin (1951).
24. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
25. U.C.C. § 2-315.
26. See 1 Williston, Sales § 235 (Rev. ed. 1948).
27. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0116 (1) (1943): "Where the buyer, expressly or by impli-
cation, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, whether he is the
grower or manufacturer or not, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reason-
ably fit for that purpose."
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to be implied it has been ruled that actual knowledge by the seller
of the buyer's particular purpose is essential.28 In one case, how-
ever, the North Dakota Supreme Court has used language indi-




It is significart that §2-315 makes no reference to the impli-
cation of the warranty of fitness in sales of goods under patent or
trade names, contrary to the present law. The Uniform Sales Act
provides: "In case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified
article under its patent or trade name, there is no implied warranty
as to its fitness for any particular purpose."3° This provision ap-
parently was intended as a restatement of the common law rule
that where a known, described and definite article was purchased,
there was no implied warranty of fitness,'3 1 because by selecting a
particular object the buyer was not relying on the seller's judge-
ment. 2 Although there are no North Dakota cases on the point,
most courts have refused to construe the patent or trade name
exception literally and generally tend to ignore it.33 The UCC
apparently endorses this position and omits the rule. As a result,
the buyer's request for a patent or trade name article would not
per se preclude an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, but would merely be an evidentiary fact to be considered
along with other circumstances in determining whether or not the
buyer actually relied on the seller.
34
It should be noted that in the event of an inconsistency be-
tween the implied warranty of fitness provided for by this section
and an express warranty, the implied warranty will be given pre-
cedence."
There is presently, with one exception, 6 no provision in the
28, Cretors v. Troyer, 63 N.D. 231, 247 N.W. 558 (1933); Northwest Engineering Co.
v. Giellefald-Chapman Construction Co., 57 N.D. 500, 222 N.W. 621 (1928); Minneapolis
Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N.D. 832, 201 N.W. 172 (1924).
29. Allis-Chalmers' Manufacturing Co. v. Frank, 57 N.D. 295, 221 N.W. 75 (1928):
"Where the evidence shows the seller had reason to know the purpose for which goods
were purchased and required, there is an implied warranty on the part of the seller that the
tractor was reasonably fit for that purpose."
30. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0116 (4) (1943).
31. Void, Sales 462 (1931).
32. Seitz v. Brewer's Refrigerating Machine Co., 141 U. S. 510 (1891).
33. Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, 111 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1940); Bagley v. International
Harvester Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 922, 206 P.2d 43 (1949); Miller v. Economy Hog and
Cattle Powder Co., 288 Iowa 626, 293 N.W. 4 (1940); Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun
Co., 136 Me. 512, 3 A.2d 650 (1939); Rowe Manufacturing Co. v. Curtis Straub Co.,
223 Iowa 858, 273 N.W. 895 (1917).
34. See Note, 57 Yale L. J. 1389 (1953).
35. U.C.C. § 2-317.
36. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0116 (3) (1943): "If the buyer has examined the goods,
there is no implied warranty as regards the defects which such examination ought to have
revealed."
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North Dakota Code dealing with the subject matter of §2-316 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. This section provides for the ex-
clusion and modification of express and implied warranties. Under
current case law it is possible to disclaim all warranties, both express
and implied, 7 but some unique reasoning has been employed to
vitiate the effect of these disclaimer clauses as applied to implied
warranties. It has been said, for example, that since the implied
warranties are imposed by law, they are not as such governed by
an agreement between the parties. : 8 The UCC apparently approves
this tendency of strict construction against the seller by saying that
the disclaimer must be in specific language and any ambiguity
shall be resolved against the seller. 19
The principle alteration of present law entailed by adoption
of the UCC concerns a UCC subsection which prohibits disclaimer
of any express warranty once it is assumed.'O This should be con-
sidered in the light of another section declaring warranties by
sample and by description as well as by affirmation to be express
warranties." Consequently, as already indicated, a number of
warranties which are implied under present law would become
express warranties, free from disclaimer under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
The further requirement that the exclusion or modification of
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or of
merchantability must be in specific language is evidence of the at-
tempt by the UCC to better the position of the relatively inex-
perienced buyer in his dealings with the seller. This provision is
not inconsistent with the case law in this state 42 but a statutory
clarification would be useful.
Although this particular section of the UCC in general greatly
improves the status of the buyer, in one respect it falls short of the
privileges already granted under North Dakota's present law.
North Dakota's statutes provide that a person buying a tractor,
engine or harvesting machine shall have a reasonable time to test
it and if not satisfactory can rescind and return it.43 The statute
37. Sayeg v. Gloria Light Co., 236 App. Div. 761, 259 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1932);
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926).
38. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927); Hardy v. General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928).
39. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2).
40. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1)
41. U.C.C. § 2-313.
42. See Deere and Webber Company v. Moch, 71 N.D. 649, 3 N.W.2d 471 (1942);
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926).
43. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0707 (1943).
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further provides that any provision between the parties contrary
to the intent of the section shall be ineffecive. North Dakota is
said to be the only state which has so expressly limited the waiver
of any of the implied warranties provided for in the Uniform
Sales Act.
44
The Uniform Commercial Code, in dealing with the cumula-
tion and conflict of warranties, provides that they shall be construed
to be consistent with each other and as cumulative. 41 In case of
,conflict the intent of the parties is dominant. The general rule at
present is that both express and implied warranties can exist side
by side if they are not inconsistent,46 but if they are found to be
inconsistent the express warranty will prevail. 4  This result is
based on the premise that the expressed intent of the parties should
prevail over a warranty which is created by operation of law.
This section of the UCC is essentially the same as the present
provisions regarding conflict of warranties found in the Uniform
Sales Act,48 with the exception that the proposed provision would
hold an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to
.supreme in the event of an inconsistency with an express warranty.
HARRY PIPPIN
GEORGE DYNES.
BuLK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. -
Though statutes regulating the sale of goods in bulk are relatively
new to the law, they have spread rapidly, with the result that some
confusion has been occasioned through their rather disorganized
incorporation into the statute books of the various jurisdictions. The
purpose of such statutes is concisely summed up in the introduction
to the Bulk Transfers Article in the UCC. They are intended to
deal with two common forms of commercial fraud: (1) "The mer-
chant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to a friend for
less than it is worth, pays his ceditors less than he owes them, and
'hopes to come back into the business through the back door some
time in the future," and (2) "the merchant, owing debts, who sells
44. See Note, 57 Yale L. J. 1389, 1401, n. 70 (1953).
45. U.C.C. § 2-317.
46. Rowe Manufacturing Co. v. Curtis-Straub Co., 223 Iowa 858, 273 N.W. 895 (1937);
'Peterson v. Dreher, 196 Iowa 178, 194 N.W. 53 (1923); Northwest Engineering Co. v.
Giellefald-Chapman Construction Co., 57 N.D. 500, 222 N.W. 621 (1928).
47. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0116 (6) (1943) provides: "An express warranty or condition
does not negative a warranty or condition implied under this chapter unless inconsistent
therewith."
48. See note 47,supra.
